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 Inclusive Governance over Agricultural Biotechnology: Risk Assessment and 
Public Participation 
Deryck Beyleveld and Li Jianjun 
 
ABSTRACT 
A public outcry opposing the use of genetic modification of rice has produced a 
governance deadlock in China, which threatens to undermine attempts to reap the 
benefits that modern agricultural biotechnology can offer to the Chinese people. It is 
argued that this opposition to the agricultural use of modern technology is, in large 
part, the result, not only of lack of public participation in the decisions involved, but 
of an over-reliance on conventional approaches to risk assessment that do not 
adequately take account of the interests of all who stand to be affected by the use of 
the technology. Public participation is necessary, but it must be guided by equitable 
principles that take proper account of the rights and interests of all stakeholders. It is 
argued that a governance strategy based on the Principle of Generic Consistency 
(PGC) of the American philosopher Alan Gewirth has promise to counter the distrust 
of the regulators that fuels the deadlock because the PGC can be justified from the 
perspective of Marxist and Confucian principles that dominate the Chinese political 
and ethical landscape. 
 
1. Introduction 
China has a large population and is short of agricultural resource. Modern agricultural 
biotechnology,
1
 using techniques of genetic modification, is (in principle) very 
promising‒some would say, essential‒for the Chinese Government to be able to 
respond adequately to the increasing challenges to food security faced by China in the 
context of globalization, urbanization and climate change. 
However, licensing of genetically modified (GM) crops in 2009 led to an 
unanticipated outcry over the internet that has prevented the Chinese government 
from agreeing to the commercial use of GM crops. 
Given the efficiency that characterizes Chinese government systems in decision 
making about major economic affairs in general, and Chinese enthusiasm for 
innovation and development, the case of GM crops in China might seem strange. In 
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 Agricultural biotechnology refers to technologies that use living organisms, biological components 
and biological processes in the agriculture and food industry to create useful products that are 
important for our wellbeing and way of life. 
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this paper, we attempt to understand how this deadlock has arisen, and suggest what 
we call ‘an inclusive governance approach’ to deal with the public distrust of 
mainstream scientists that, we argue, contributes significantly to public opposition to 
the commercialization of GM crops. 
We begin by describing the governance deadlock. We then argue that public 
opposition to the use of GM crops has arisen, at least in part, because the governance 
strategy employed has been based on a methodology of risk assessment that purports 
to be value free, but at least appears to privilege the values and interests of 
mainstream scientists and specific economic interest groups by not taking adequate 
account of the interests of all who stand to be affected (negatively as well as 
positively) by the use of GM crops. Almost all debates on risk assessment and public 
decision making of agricultural biotechnology in China in the last few decades have 
been dominated by technological experts, and most risk communication and 
management has permitted only limited lay person participation. Furthermore, insofar 
as ethical arguments have been employed in the regulatory debate, these have tended 
to be confined to economic considerations from an utilitarian perspective, and rights 
arguments have only figured in connection with regulation of the labelling of food. 
But, we argue, scientific risk assessment cannot be divorced from questions about the 
rights, interests and wishes of human beings, and we suggest that the lack of a 
concern with what various interest groups view as their rights is an important factor 
that contributes to the current intractable situation. 
To some extent, the regulators have begun to appreciate the need for lay participation 
in the decision-making processes involved. We argue, however, that there has been 
insufficient recognition of the need for a more precautionary approach, and we 
suggest that a promising way forward would be to build a governance strategy around 
Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC)2 (which requires agents to 
act in accord with the essential needs of agency of all agents). This, we argue, is not 
only because the PGC is capable of providing a structured way of conceiving and 
handling conflicts between various interests; it is a principle that can be justified on 
the basis of key Marxist and Confucian principles that dominate Chinese political and 
ethical thought. 
 
2. The GM Governance Deadlock in China 
On 22 October 2009, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture's Biosafety Committee 
issued biosafety certificates to the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences for a 
genetically modified (GM) maize designed to improve the efficiency of animal feed 
and reduce the pollution of animal manure, and to Huazhong Agricultural University 
for two kinds of GM rice varieties–Hua Hui 1 and Bt Shanyou 63–designed to 
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 See, seminally, Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
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incorporate biological insecticides and so increase yields of rice.
3
 This constituted a 
radical step in GM staple food development that would lead to a substantial increase 
in the release of GM foods into the environment and the commercialization of GM 
rice and maize. Shortly thereafter, Chinese GM rice breeders confidently announced 
that they would be commercializing GM rice and enabling hundreds of millions of 
Chinese people to eat GM food within a few years, though approval still needed to be 
given for production and commercialization in accordance with the Statute of 
Agricultural GM Biology, the Law of Seeds, and the Approval Procedure for Main 
Crops Varieties.  
However, these breeders and their supporters soon found that their ambitions were 
opposed by unprecedented public concern expressed in social debates. As a 
consequence, the Chinese government has not yet approved the commercialization of 
any GM staple crops. Because China is a country with a large population and is short 
of agricultural resource, the Chinese government has a very strong motivation to 
apply agricultural biotechnology to deal with the increasing importance of food 
security in the context of globalization, urbanization and climate change. Indeed, in 
the words of some agricultural biologists, there is no alternative to developing GM 
crops. 
The negative public reaction was not anticipated. As early as the late 1990s, a GM 
‘super cotton’ was introduced and commercially cultivated without any public 
opposition, and even without biosecurity regulation, when the Chinese cotton industry 
suffered severe bollworm disease and yield loss. The ‘super cotton’ has proved to be a 
very beneficial agricultural innovation. Soon after, China began to put in place a 
biosecurity regulatory system for GM crops that mainly imitated the United States, 
with the aim of promoting agricultural biotechnology innovation. Since then, China 
has allowed GM cotton, tomato, sweet pepper, petunia, poplar and papaya for 
commercial cultivation, and licensed for feed or oil processing the raw materials of 
GM soybean, rapeseed, corns and cotton imports. 
However, public concern and debate over GM rice has now, to some extent, shaken 
the Chinese government’s strategic will to speedily promote the commercialization of 
agricultural biotechnology and is reshaping the Chinese governance landscape for GM 
crops. Like the position in the West, proponents of GM modification, mostly 
biotechnology experts, favour weak regulation based on the so called ‘substantial 
equivalence’ principle, according to which products of agricultural biotechnology, 
such as GM rice, or GM crops generally, are as safe as conventional agricultural 
products, while opponents call for regulation to be based on a precautionary principle 
that aims to avoid all kinds of potential risks to human welfare and freedom that arise 
from uncertainty about, and ignorance of, the possible effects of the developments. 
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 年第二批农业转基因生物安全证书批准清单[List of the Second Batch of Approved Biosafety 
Certificates for Agricultural GMOs in 2009]. 
http://www.stee.agri.gov.cn/biosafety/spxx/t20091022_819217.htm. This and all internet sites 
referenced as accessed on 19/07/2017. 
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The opposition came mainly from the general public (especially from consumers in 
the cities), social scientists and humanities scholars, although it did include some 
natural scientists. 
Concerns were raised about the uncertainty surrounding possible impacts on Chinese 
health and food safety, in which opponents exhorted citizens to refuse to be treated as 
‘white mice’ for the novel GM rice. A few radicals even declared that the 
commercialization of GM rice is a ‘national suicide’ project,4 and a conspiracy 
directed by American government and its food empire that, in the words of Jiang 
Gaoming, a professor at the Institute of Botany of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
‘would sacrifice the interests of the majority for the interests of a minority’.5 Indeed, 
in expressing doubts about the advantages of GM rice designed to produce high yields 
and resistance to plant diseases and insect pests, Professor Jiang predicted that the 
commercialization of GM rice ‘would eventually result in ecosystem turbulence’.6  
Others joined forces with him. For example, 
 Yuan Longping, at the Chinese Academy of Engineering, who is regarded as 
the father of hybrid rice because he bred a series of rice varieties with high 
yields by natural hybrid processes, suggested that the Government should be 
cautious about ratifying the commercialization of GM crops because scientists 
do not know all the potential risks that GM rice poses to human well-being 
and the environment, and some impacts will only be revealed in several 
generations to come.
7
  
 Xue Dayuan, a biodiversity specialist at the China Environment Protection 
Ministry and a professor at Minzu University, stressed that the potential risk to 
human and environment is unidentifiable in the short term and expressed 
concerns that GM rice could transfer recombinant DNA to other plants, thus 
threatening biodiversity, or that they it might create a super weed or kill 
unintended organisms.
8
  
 A physical chemist, Wang Chaohua, who has conducted soybean and research 
for the US Department of Agriculture, was very skeptical about the supposed 
benefits of the two new strains of rice, and pronounced that it is a ‘scary fact’ 
that GM seeds may be unable to adapt to abrupt climate changes and thus 
cause sharp drops in output, leading to a vicious cycle in which farmers plant 
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 牧川.转基因水稻：最新国民自杀计划［EB/OL］[Mu Chuan. ‘GM Rice: A “National Suicide” 
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 蒋高明.农业部批准转基因水稻商业化种植为什么不愿公开有关细节［EB/OL］[Jiang Gaoming. 
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 王国平.袁隆平: 转基因水稻商业化种植需慎重[N] [Wang Guoping and Yuan Longping, 
‘Commercialization of GM Rice Should be Careful.’] 
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more GM seeds to counter crop failures, which leads to further drops in output, 
which leads to further planting of GM seeds, and so on. He also claimed that 
GM foods ‘have the potential to cause serious health damage even within a 
very short period’ and, worse still, the potential to cause ‘irrecoverable 
damage to the soil’.9  
 And over a hundred humanities scholars signed an online petition calling for 
the commercialization of GM rice to be prohibited, claiming that the issue of 
staple crops is a matter of concern for the national economy, peoples’ 
livelihoods, and future generations, and that the public must have the right to 
informed consent on this issue.
10
 They furthermore claimed that the necessary 
conditions for the safe commercialization of GM rice and maize in China have 
not be satisfied in the absence of a strict and systemic risk assessment 
mechanism, and a fair and transparent decision-making system and procedure 
involving public participation and respect for consumers’ rights, and they 
urged that the Chinese Government set up an independent interdisciplinary 
committee to investigate and assess the policy and social impacts of 
commercializing of GM crops.
11
 
On the other hand, advocates, most of them experts in biotechnology, who have a 
dominant say in the formulation of policy, insisted that the technology is precisely 
controlled and safe, and criticized the opponents for their ‘ignorance’ and a ‘phobia’ 
against anything obtained through genetic modification.
12
 In this, some of the public 
antagonism in China mirrors opposition to gene technology in the West. 
However, increasingly, Chinese citizens engage in public discussion concerning vital 
interests through communication on social media,
13
 such as Weibo (microblogging), 
and the anti-GM initiatives that began early in 2010 have been conducted mainly in 
the public media, especially the internet.
14
 The confrontation there has hardly been 
polite, and cannot be construed as a debate. It is characterized by depiction of those 
on the other side as acting out of personal or sectional interest, dishonesty, ignorance, 
or a combination of these. Rather than seeking to find some common ground on 
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 Wang Chaohua: ‘Dangers are There for All to See’. 
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 曹南燕等.关于暂缓推广转基因主粮的呼吁书[N]. [Cao Nanyan, et al, ‘Appeal for the Suspension 
of GM Staple Crops.’] 2010-03-12 http://www.sciencenet.cn/m/user_content.aspx?id=301776 
11海外学者：我们关于转基因水稻、玉米商业化的意见[N]. [Overseas Scholars, ’Our Opinions on the 
Commercialization of GM Rice and Corns.’] 
http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class16/201003/139268.html 
12
 李建军.2012.关于转基因水稻商业化的辩论——相关的伦理和公共治理问题，科学学研究 [N]. 
[Li Jianjun, ‘The Chinese Debate on Commercializing GM Rice: Ethical Issues and Related Public 
Governance Issues.’] (2012) 30(8）Studies in Science of Science, 1121–1127. 
13 A. Ely et al, ‘Sustainable Maize Production and Consumption in China: Practices and Politics in 
Transition’ (2016) 134 Journal of Cleaner Production 259–268. 
Before 2010, most people in rural China did not have easy access to the internet. But now almost all 
young people can use it easily in rural China, and they use it for social activities and E-business (which 
links the farm to supermarkets and consumers in cities directly). 
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which rational discussion can proceed, those on the other side instead regularly have 
their motives questioned and are subjected to personal invective, not unlike the 
current ‘debates’ in social media in the West between some supporters of President 
Trump and Hillary Clinton in the United States, or between some hard-line supporters 
of Brexit and its opponents in the United Kingdom. So, we surmise, but can only 
surmise, that the difficulties that exist with imposing quality control over content on 
the internet exacerbate the problem of achieving a rational debate in proportion to the 
extent to which communicative interaction is internet based.
15
 
In any event, unwilling to ignore the antagonistic public reaction, the Chinese 
government has not yet approved the commercialization of any GM staple crops; and, 
though GM animals, such as fish, have been available in China since the late 1980s, 
they cannot yet be commercialized.
16
 The result is that the existing policy amounts to 
one of ‘permitting to eat but not allowing to plant’. On the one hand, China imports a 
huge volume of GM soybeans and maize in order to satisfy increasing industrial and 
livestock raising needs. On the other hand, the commercialization of GM maize and 
rice promoted by Chinese corporations faces such strong opposition that it has been 
suspended.  
In order to deal with this impasse, the Chinese Government has set up a dedicated 
agency to collect and analyze online public opinion in order to understand public 
opinions and responses to all kinds of public decision and policy, and this is where the 
matter now stands. 
 
3. Risk Assessment of Agricultural Biotechnology and Related Uncertainties 
Like all technological innovations, agricultural biotechnology is a future-oriented 
endeavor; so its governance necessarily requires balancing the desire to harness 
potential future benefits with sensitivity to existing uncertainties and a constructive 
engagement with diverse societal needs and concerns.
17
 While agricultural 
biotechnology is used to produce food, a basic human need, it also has the potential to 
affect the environment in a way that impacts negatively on basic human needs, and it 
is clear that, to some extent at least, the governance crisis has been caused by public 
concern and fears over the risk and safety of the processes and products involved.  
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Less obviously, perhaps, agricultural biotechnology might be applied in ways that are 
harmful to moral interests.
18
 For example, agricultural biotechnology can raise social 
justice issues and infringe human rights by interfering with the right to choose what 
one wants to eat. When it involves animal biotechnology and synthetic biology to 
create functional chimera and hybrids between humans and animals, it also raises 
concerns focussed on human dignity. More speculatively, as some opponents have 
claimed, the widespread use of agricultural biotechnology might bring about 
large-scale disasters or pose ‘existential risks’ that would permanently curtail 
humanity’s ability to flourish.19 While this might seem unlikely, unimaginable and 
distant, the accumulation of small probabilities can result in big disasters and 
endanger local or global public goods that constitute the fundamental conditions 
individuals need for a good life lived autonomously. In general, it cannot be altogether 
discounted that the development of agricultural biotechnology could engage 
significant human moral and political interests, implying that we should prudently and 
seriously regulate this kind of technology and its commercialization. 
But how are the relevant risks to be assessed?  Risk assessment has been the 
foundation of existing governance frameworks for agricultural biotechnology, in 
particular, for GM foods. The so-called ‘principle of substantial equivalence’ 
proposed and used for GM food governance in the United States, which is based on an 
initial scientific assessment of the safety risk of GM crops, is founded on the idea that, 
unless otherwise shown, products of agricultural biotechnology, such as GM rice or 
GM crops, are as safe as conventional agricultural products. On the other hand, ‘the 
precautionary principle’ used in European agricultural and environmental 
biotechnology governance is based on the idea that, because of unknown risks and 
uncertainty, it should be presumed that the products of agricultural biotechnology are 
unsafe unless otherwise shown. As an increasingly strong economic power with the 
largest population in the world, China is caught in an unprecedented technological 
decision making and governance dilemma that requires it to choose between these two 
approaches. 
The term ‘risk’, properly speaking, refers to a situation in which it is possible 
confidently to quantify both the magnitudes of harm and the probabilities of harm 
eventuating of a defined range of outcomes; that is, risk is a product of the probability 
and the severity of the defined hazards that an action might produce. This conception 
has been incorporated in concrete regulations, such as the ‘procedural manual’ of the 
Codex Alimentary Commission 2014 (CAC), where risk is designated as a function of 
the probability of an adverse health effect and the severity of that effect, consequential 
to a hazard(s) in food, and risk assessment is depicted as a scientifically based process 
consisting of the following steps: (i) hazard identification, (ii) hazard characterization, 
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(iii) exposure assessment, and (iv) risk characterization.
20
 
This conventional approach to risk assessment has generally been applied to the 
characterization of risks from a chemical additive or pesticide with well-characterized 
and known toxicity and substantial long-term data on standard consumption levels. 
But in many examples of agricultural biotechnology, these approaches encounter all 
kinds of uncertainty, which renders such quantification incomplete or problematic, 
because neither the regulators nor the scientists can provide enough and explicit 
scientific evidence about whether or not various hazards might or might not exist, let 
alone with what probability they exist. As against the situations with which they have 
been familiar, they are confronted with situations in which the uncertainty they face is 
one in which probabilities cannot be attributed to future states, which are often 
indeterminate themselves. To complicate matters, for various reasons, this uncertainty 
is not simply the absence of knowledge,
21
 and this means that knowledge diffusion or 
science popularization is not enough to mitigate public suspicion about risk 
assessment. Given the possible long term and large scale impact of agricultural 
biotechnology to our food chain and environment, due to limits of predictability, 
knowledge-ability, or the use of novel procedures, risk assessment and risk 
governance have to face all kinds of fear and disagreement about so-called ‘unknown 
unknowns’.22 In this context, decision making must take into account that there are 
multiple subjects, bringing diﬀerent values, knowledge and interests to bear on the 
situation that can, in the main, be avoided in conventional scenarios. 
We suggest that the ‘extreme uncertainty’ surrounding the effects of agricultural 
biotechnology should be characterized as a cognitive condition in which regulators 
believe that is possible (or, not impossible) that X might ‘bring about’ (cause, result in, 
or lead to) Z, which is to say that regulators are neither certain that X brings about Z 
nor certain that X does not bring about Z, that is, they (regulators and their expert 
advisors) can say only that the probability of X causing Z is ›0‹1. Assuming that 
regulators have a negative conative attitude towards Z (that is, they fear that X might 
cause Z), it surely would be irresponsible for them simply to gamble on their fears 
being misplaced. However, it is far from self-evident that regulators would act 
rationally and responsibly if they took precautionary measures to protect against Z 
when (1) it is not certain that X will lead to Z, indeed, when the likelihood of X 
leading to Z could be anywhere in the range ›0‹1; and (2) the conative attitude 
towards X is positive (so that restricting or giving up X has a negative value). 
Generally, in some such conditions, limited scientific facts cannot be expected to play 
a decisive role in a convincing decision making basis.
23
 
                                                             
20
Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual. Twenty-second ed. 2014. 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_22e.pdf 
21
 Paul Sollie, ‘On Uncertainty in Ethics and Technology’ in Paul Sollie and Marcus Düwell (eds), 
Evaluating New Technologies: Methodological Problems for the Ethical Assessment of Technology 
Development The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology 3, DOI 
10.1007/978-90-481-2229-5 10, (Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2009) 141-158 
22
 Ibid. 151. 
23
 Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 12). 
9 
 
A basic problem is that, risk assessment, as the foundation of existing governance 
frameworks for agricultural biotechnology, is regularly claimed to be ‘science-based’ 
and free of values. So, when the decision making and governance of agricultural 
biotechnology is confined to a technical assessment of risks to human and 
environmental health, it limits who can legitimately participate in decision-making 
processes, and privileges technical experts. The inclusion of nontechnical experts is 
currently confined to the end of the risk assessment process, when public stakeholders 
are invited to comment on expert-defined assessments of environmental and human 
health risk without much potential to influence the assessment itself.
24
 However, 
because of the kinds of uncertainty that surround the effects of agricultural 
biotechnology, ‘a rational risk assessment’ must take into account ethical and social 
concerns. The governance process must, indeed, include the three conventionally 
recognized elements of risk analysis-risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication. But it must also extend beyond them. Indeed, public perceptions of 
risk and related uncertainties should be a focus for agricultural biotechnology 
governance. A governance that takes into account all relevant risks and uncertainties 
needs to be based not only on valid and reliable scientific research but also needs to 
consider public experience and perception of these risks and uncertainties, for it is 
only on the basis of knowing and understanding this perception that the reasons for 
resisting scientific assessments can be responded to rationally. In short, to deal 
rationally with the uncertainty surrounding risk assessment and have responsible 
governance, it is necessary for regulators to consider public concerns and mobilize 
public participation. This because the governance aim is not only to protect 
consumers from risk and uncertainty but also to produce a just distribution of benefits 
and interests that might result from the application of new technology. As 
Hermansson and Hanson
25
 have persuasively claimed, there is a big difference 
between (i) A having the benefit and also taking the risk, and (ii) A having the benefit 
but B taking the risk.
26
 
 
4. Public Participation and Conflicts of Values and Rights 
On this basis, we approve the fact that public participation in agricultural 
biotechnology governance has recently gained mainstream support in China. At first 
glance, the general public is concerned about the impact of novel GM rice on their 
own health because of rumors to the effect that GM rice or corn contains certain 
toxins that might cause cancer or infertility and so on. If this were true, it would 
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certainly be an unacceptable ‘existential risk’ for most Chinese, who use rice as a 
staple. Therefore, unless they are persuaded that this risk is not real, many people will, 
perfectly reasonably, be resistant to the commercialization of GM rice. After all, most 
of the end products of agricultural biotechnology, such as GM rice, are going to be 
introduced into the supermarket and dining table, and so incorporated into the human 
food chain. 
But public concern over agricultural biotechnology is not only limited to the possible 
health risks, but also includes fears about possible environmental disasters and social 
issues, such as the impact of the extension and prevalence of agricultural 
biotechnology for small farmers without investment capacity. And it is also very 
important that risk assessment addressees a series of right claims, such as the right of 
citizens to information they need for public decision making, the right of consumers 
to choose autonomously what they eat, as well as the right of farmers to choose freely 
what they plant, and so on. We suggest that, given the uncertainties that genuinely 
exist, (often unacknowledged) conflict over values and rights is an important reason 
why the debate about GM rice has been irrational and polarized, thus making the 
governance intractable.  
But this has not been adequately recognized by many proponents of agricultural 
biotechnology, especially some biotechnological experts and regulators. They persist 
in considering the decision making stalemate to be largely a product of scientific 
irrationality or ignorance on the part of the public, the legitimacy crisis to be due to 
knowledge deficiencies of the public. Consequently, they take it for granted that 
scientific knowledge diffusion and education will mitigate the governance conflicts. 
However, because this is not always the case, the more scientists preach science to the 
public, the fiercer resistance from the public becomes, and the resistance is 
transformed into a crisis of public distrust of decision makers and regulators. It seems 
to us, therefore, that China has been making the same mistake as has characterized 
public engagement in the West (especially in the UK). As Sheila Jasonoff argues, 
while public engagement has been recognised to be a good idea in the West, it has 
been executed very poorly.
27
 
In a sense, rational precautionary reasoning is necessary to mitigate the governance 
stalemate. But in order to make precautionary reasoning rational, we need to devise a 
responsible, just and inclusive governance strategy which pays more attention to the 
risk perception and mindset of the public which is driven by moral values and social 
concerns. If and when adopted regulations do not comply with the public’s perception 
of risks, policy makers will find themselves under pressure to ban or restrict the use of 
the respective products. So, making a wise choice on a case-by-case requires public 
debate involving many voices.
28
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But this involvement is not enough. This is because there has developed a 
fundamental distrust of technocrats and regulators. This distrust is partly due to 
institutional deficiencies, such as lack of risk communication mechanisms about 
emerging technologies, or less transparency about regulatory criteria and procedures. 
But the main problem lies in the arrogance of technocrats and some regulators who 
often intentionally or unintentionally disregard the reasonable claims of basic rights 
from citizens, for example, the right to information needed for decision making. 
Furthermore, a few scientists’ misconduct, recurrent severe food safety scandals (over, 
e.g., poisoned milk powder, and accidental exposure of all kinds of illegal planting of 
GM rice) exacerbates the suspicions of the public about scientific evidence and a 
regulatory system based on risk assessment. This has, not unreasonably, created an 
environment in which a variety of rumors and provocative emotions from network 
platforms and social media exacerbates distrust and irrational responses to different 
opinions and values.  
To sum up. Given past experience and current public attitudes towards agricultural 
biotechnology, public participation could be the most effective way to break the 
existing governance deadlock. But who has the right to express their concerns? Who 
should regulators be morally and politically responsible to? These are crucial 
questions, for including various groups will not be enough to produce decisions that 
will be generally acceptable unless we are able to justify the governance and decision 
making framework to those who have very different views about rights and who 
should be subjects of our moral concerns. To do this requires both a new regulatory 
system and a generally acceptable moral theory.  
 
5. The Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) and the Possibility of Inclusive 
Governance 
The fundamental questions for a strategy of inclusive governance concern, first, how 
to build/rebuild trust for the authority of decision making, and, second, how morally 
and politically to justify the authority of governance. Public engagement and 
deliberate democracy or discourse ethics may be feasible tactics but this can only 
succeed when conducted in a context in which there is agreement about the general 
principle and criteria for us to cope with all kinds of conflicts of values and rights 
claims. We will not attempt to answer the first question as such, though it is not 
implausible to think that institutionalization of an acceptable answer to the second 
implies an answer to the first question. So, our focus will be on what kind of moral 
theory can perform this function?  
In the context of current China, the dominant ideologies are Marxism and 
Confucianism. As a significant political theory, Marxism provides the justification 
politically and morally for the leadership of the Communist Party in China, which 
emphasizes that social governance should be for the people and by the people, but it is 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Annual Meeting, Saturday 18 February. https://royalsociety.org/~/media/news/ 2017/ 
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debatable whether it can play an important and proper role in agricultural 
biotechnology governance over matters regarding extreme uncertainty about the 
future. Compared with Marxism, Confucianism has more than 2000 years of historical 
and cultural accumulation and still has a pivotal place in Chinese society. However, 
its general principle, the Golden Rule: ‘Do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you’ has rarely been appealed to as a standard to govern public decision making 
about governance in a risky society. So, even if we believe conformity with Marxism 
and Confucianism is necessary for any moral theory that can do the job we wish to 
assign to it, we still need to show how these links can be effected. 
According to Gewirth,
29
 the PGC is not only the supreme principle of morality, but 
the supreme principle of all practical reason. By saying that it is the supreme principle 
of morality, he means that it is the principle that anyone who accepts that morality 
exists (i.e., anyone who believes that there is a system of practical precepts governed 
by an absolutely unconditional impartial imperative, a categorical imperative that 
requires agents to treat all agents with equal concern and respect when considering the 
permissibility of their own actions) must accept as the standard for their conduct 
simply by understanding the idea of morality. By saying that it is the supreme 
principle of practical reason, he means that it is the principle that anyone who reasons 
practically (i.e., does something for reasons) must accept as the criterion for assessing 
rational action. 
He thus claims that the PGC is trans-historical, not in the sense that it has been 
accepted in all cultures and times, but that it is a principle with which all practical 
precepts of all cultures and times unconditionally ought to be consistent. This is not to 
say that cultural variability is not permissible, merely that cultural sovereignty may 
apply to the choice of norms only if these are consistent with the PGC. 
He attempts to justify this claim by arguing that the PGC is ‘dialectically necessary’ 
for agents. By this he means that any agent who fails to accept the PGC 
misunderstands what it is to be an agent (i.e., misunderstands what it is to be capable 
of being guided by any practical precepts at all), and thereby implicitly denies being 
an agent, thus denying being capable of accepting/acting in accord with any practical 
precepts at all. The notion of being an agent he employs is very thin. Agents are 
defined as beings able to act for reasons, and an action is defined as the voluntary use 
of means in order to achieve one’s chosen purpose (a purpose that one voluntarily 
consents to). As such, there is nothing culturally specific, or historically contingent, 
about the concept of agency employed. 
Gewirth’s argument for the PGC may be presented as having the following form.30 It 
is argued, first (Stage One), that the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives (PHI), 
which states 
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 If an agent wishes to achieve the agent’s chosen purpose E (or act under the 
agent’s chosen purpose P), and doing X or having Y is necessary to do so, 
then the agent ought to do X or pursue having Y, or give up E (or P) 
is dialectically necessary for an agent (any agent); i.e., not to accept the PHI is for an 
agent to imply that he or she is not able to pursue any purpose or act under any 
practical precept.  
Now, if there are conditions that are necessary for an agent to achieve the agent’s 
purposes (in the sense that not to have the conditions in place will have a negative 
effect on the agent’s ability to achieve the agent’s purposes), whatever they are 
(which conditions Gewirth designates as necessary goods, but which may also be 
called generic conditions of agency [GCAs], which are categorically instrumental 
needs for agency, i.e., instrumental conditions regardless of E or P), and there clearly 
are, such as, life, and the necessary means to this, accurate information about the 
means to one’s purposes, and sufficient mental equilibrium of make attempts to 
pursue (translate a desire for E into action for E), then it is dialectically necessary for 
an agent (any agent) to consider that the agent ought to defend the agent’s GCAs 
unless the agent is willing to suffer generic damage to the agent’s ability to act. 
Gewirth then argues (Stage Two) that it follows that it is dialectically necessary for an 
agent (any agent) to consider that the agent has positive as well as negative rights to 
the GCAs under the will conception thereof, meaning that other agents ought not to 
interfere with the agent’s possession of the GCAS against the agent’s will and ought 
(if able to do so) to aid to agent to achieve secure this possession of the agent is 
unable to secure this possession by the agent’s own unaided efforts, and wishes 
assistance. 
Finally (Stage Three), he argues that, because it is dialectically necessary for an agent 
to hold this, it follows that it is dialectically necessary for the agent to accept that all 
agents equally have these rights to the GCAs, and consequently because the agent 
referred to is any agent, it is dialectically necessary for all agents to accept this. 
Stages Two and Three have not been universally accepted by philosophers who have 
considered Gewirth’s argument.31 While we consider that they are mistaken in their 
criticisms, mainly because they fail to portray the argument correctly,
32
 we do not 
need to rely on this argument for the purposes of this paper. 
This is because Gewirth is surely correct when he maintains that it is dialectically 
necessary for agents to accept the PHI and that there are GCAs. It follows from this 
that anyone who holds that agents ought to treat all agents with equal concern and 
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respect for their agency (for their humanity, as Kant
33
 would say), must accept the 
PGC. Whether or not acceptance of this premise can be shown to be dialectically 
necessary for agents, or something that all agents necessarily ought to accept for some 
other reason, such a premise operates as a key principle within, e.g., the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948,
34
 within Kantianism, 
utilitarianism,
35
 discourse ethics,
36
 and Confucianism,
37
 It is also implicit in the 
Marxist slogan ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’.38 
Thus, we contend that, regardless of whether or not the PGC is accepted by those who 
hold these theories, they necessarily ought to accept the PGC or else give up the 
impartiality premises they purport to accept. In other words, our claim is that the PGC 
is as acceptable (in principle) in China (through Confucianism and Marxism) as it is 
the West (through, e.g., Kantianism, utilitarianism, and discourse ethics) and 
anywhere on the basis of acceptance of the UDHR 1948. Indeed, if human needs are 
understood as the GCAs, then the Marxist dictum is well-nigh identical to what the 
PGC states.
39
        
How the PGC is to be applied to generate a picture of an ideal community of rights as 
the first principle of dispute resolution has been discussed elsewhere,
40
 as has the fact 
that the PGC, while primarily and directly protective of agents, and not of human 
beings (let alone other creatures that lack the capacities for agency), nevertheless 
imposes precautionary duties on agents to respect the interests of such beings (which 
is important in assessing what required for a sustainable set of living conditions that is 
morally acceptable).
41
 Since the PGC is a genuinely egalitarian principle, supporting 
an authentic community of rights (which, because the PGC views GCAs as things 
agents have rights to possess, not merely as things that they have rights not to be 
interfered with, is very different from the libertarian rights picture supported by 
American philosophers such as Robert Nozick),
42
 it authorizes, indeed, requires, the 
empowerment of all agents and communities to deny the authority of a system of 
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governance that effectively insulates the ‘expertise’ of technocrats from public 
scrutiny and genuine debate. 
Application of the PGC essentially involves assessment of the optimal balance of the 
generic interests (the GCAs) of all agents, to which the PGC grants inalienable rights. 
How these generic interests are affected by actions is however, not determinable a 
priori, and it is at this point that the question of risk assessment arises, the chief 
function of the PGC being to provide substantive criteria, a baseline, for acceptable 
moral and political decision making, whether for individual action or collective 
strategy making. In all cases the premier consideration is the impact on the generic 
interests of the individual and the collective and the symbiotic community. This must 
be done in community. There is no assumption that all will agree about outcomes here. 
What the PGC requires when disputes about ‘the right answer’ persist is that the 
authoritative answer be the outcome of a procedure that is consistent with the 
requirements of the PGC (which permits of a range of institutional designs, all of 
which, must however, include requirements that they be conducted in good faith, 
transparently, and accountably, geared towards protecting the generic interests of 
agents). 
As for risk assessment itself, if there is conventional risk about what affects generic 
interests, it is reasonable to manage risk through risk assessment based on scientific 
evidence and facts while, of course, requiring regulators to consider the risk 
experience of the public and conduct risk communication with the public. If a generic 
interest is engaged that has ascertainable risk, it is reasonable to prevent risk through 
necessary measures, to try to alleviate public concern by education on scientific 
principles, and to try to promote the application of agricultural biotechnology. 
However, If there is extreme uncertainty，then precautionary reasoning may be 
applied to suspend approval of the relevant technology and/or business application of 
it, but only if the public deems the importance of avoiding the uncertain risks of a 
negative effect on their generic interests to be more important than the real or 
uncertain positive effects of the technology on their generic interests.
43
 Without this 
caveat, the mere possibility of adverse effects on generic interests will prevent any 
applications that might and will have beneficial effects on generic interests, and to do 
allow this is irrational. 
 
6. Conclusion: Towards Inclusive Governance 
In general, the development of agricultural biotechnology involves significant moral 
and political interests for humanity, which means that we should prudently and 
seriously regulate this kind of technology and its commercialization. We have focused 
on the special context of governance of agricultural biotechnology in China, and have 
argued that regulators to apply an inclusive governance strategy which incorporates 
precautionary reasoning and public participation together. 
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Inclusive governance regulated by the PGC is a methodological framework which sets 
out some procedures that substantive risk management, regulation or decision making 
in specific contexts must follow if they are to reasonable and acceptable. Such 
governance, while it cannot guarantee public trust, has, we have argued, the potential 
to reduce distrust of the public by eliminating the domination of risk assessment by 
technocrats by providing values (the GCAs) that all can and rationally must accept.
44
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